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Comments
The Constitutionality Of California's
Public Entity Tort Claim Statutes
Since early statehood California has statutorily required that the
victim of a governmental tort file a claim against the responsible
public entity within a short period of time after the accrual of his
cause of action or risk a complete foreclosure from any subse-
quent litigation of the claim. No such requirement, other than
compliance with the normal statute of limitations, has ever been
demanded of victims of private torts. This comment reviews the
present status of California's public entity tort claim statutes to
determine whether they can withstand a constitutional challenge
based on equal protection or due process principles.
Despite the purported abrogation of the common law doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity in California,' today the public entity claim require-
ments2 frequently achieve one result of that doctrine by impeding the
recovery of damages from governmental tortfeasors. This result is ef-
fected by the statutes' provision that an individual must normally file
a notice of his claim against the government within 100 days after the
accrual of his cause of action.3 When the claimant fails to comply with
this requirement, he may be precluded from adjudicating his claim
even though -the judicial process would have been available to him if
a private party had been responsible for his injury.
Although the supreme courts in two states have struck down govern-
ment tort claim requirements as unconstitutional denials of equal pro-
tection of the law or as violations of the due process guarantees of the
1. In 1961 the California Supreme Court declared that the doctrine of governmen-
tal immunity from tort "must be discarded as mistaken and unjust." Muskopf v. Corn-
ing Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 213, 359 P.2d 457, 458, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90 (1961).
2. 'There shall be presented in accordance with [sections 900 through 915.4 of the
California Government Code] all claims for money or damages against local public
entities ...... CAL. GoV'T CODE §905. "There shall be presented in accordance with
[sections 900 through 915.4 of the California Government Code] all claims for money
or damages against the state. . . ." CAL. GOV'T CODE §905.2.
3. CAL. GoV'T CODE §911.2.
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fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution,4
California courts have steadfastly refused to accept similar arguments. 5
Because California's public entity claim statutes may also be constitu-
tionally infirm, this comment reviews and examines the equal protec-
tion and due process challenges to their validity.
CLAIM PROCEDURE IN CALIFORNIA
The victim of tortious conduct by a public entity or a public em-
ployee is faced with an elaborate statutory maze6 through which he
must travel in order to be compensated. One seeking "money or dam-
ages' 7 from a government agency must first file a written, verified
claim for damages with the appropriate board8 within either 100 days
or one year9 of the date his cause of action accrues. The claim must
contain certain facts,' 0 meet specified format requirements,1' and in-
clude an estimate of the claimant's total damages.' 2 It must be filed
even though the agency has knowledge of -the circumstances which
gave rise to the claim for damages' 3 and has commenced an investiga-
tion of the matter." Upon receipt of a timely claim, the defendant
4. Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev., Adv. Op. 78, 510 P.2d 879 (1973) (equal protec-
tion); Reich v. State Hwy. Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972) (equal protec-
tion); Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970) (due proc-
ess).
5. In Dias v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 57 Cal. 2d 502, 504, 370 P.2d 334,
335, 20 Cal. Rptr. 630, 631 (1962), the California Supreme Court stated, without fur-
ther elaboration, that it found petitioner's equal protection claim "without merit" since
public agencies "generally . . . afford[ed] a proper subject for legislative classification."
Accord, Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal. 2d 468, 481, 426 P.2d 753, 761, 58
Cal. Rptr. 249, 257 (1966); Lewis v. City & County of San Francisco, 21 Cal. App.
3d 339, 340-41, 98 Cal. Rptr. 407, 408 (1971); Wadley v. County of Los Angeles, 205
Cal. App. 2d 668, 672-73, 23 Cal. Rptr. 154, 157 (1962).
6. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§900-960.5. For a helpful guide through this tangled-web,
see O'Brien, Claims Against California Public Entities and Public Employees, 43 CAL.
S.B.J. 693 (1969); O'Brien, Suing the Sovereign in Tort, 43 L.A. BAR BULL. 11 (1967).
7. The claim requirements and related provisions do not apply solely to tort dam-
ages. A claim must be filed for any "money or damages" from public entities in Cal-
ifornia, unless the source of the claim comes within the exceptions set forth in sections
905 and 905.2 of the Government Code. For purposes of this comment, however, the
claim provisions are discussed as they relate to tort claims.
8. Claims against the state are to be filed with the State Board of Control. Claims
against local public entities are to be filed with the governing body of the local public
entity. CAL. Gov'T CODE §900.2.
9. Section 911.2 of the California Government Code provides that a claim relat-
ing to a cause of action for wrongful death, personal injury, personal property damage,
or damage to growing crops must be filed within 100 days of its accrual. Section 911.2
of the California Government Code further provides that claims relating to "any other
cause of action" shall be presented no later than one year after the accrual of the cause
of action. Section 905 sets forth those causes of action that are exceptions to the rule
that a claim must be filed.
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE §910.
11. CAL. GOV'T CODE § §910.2, 910.4.
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE §910(f).
13. Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 198, 120 P.2d 13 (1942); Allen v.
Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 173 Cal. App. 2d 126, 343 P.2d 170 (1959); Ghiozzi
v. City of S. San Francisco, 72 Cal. App. 2d 472, 164 P.2d 902 (1946).
14. Allen v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 173 Cal. App. 2d 126, 343 P.2d 170
(1959).
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agency may either accept or reject the claim, or allow the claim to be
denied by operation of law after the expiration of a 45-day period. 15
An injured party who fails to file a claim within 100 days must seek
permission from the agency to file a late claim.1 Such an application
must be filed within one year of the accrual of the cause of action;'
failure to take at least this step within one year of injury leaves the
injured party entirely without remedy.' 8 If leave to file a late claim
is denied, the prospective claimant has six months from the date of
denial to petition the court of appropriate jurisdiction for relief from
the filing requirement. The petition must allege that the denial of the
claimant's application was improper because one of the following con-
ditions existed: (1) The failure to present a timely claim was through
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect";' 9 (2) the in-
jured party was a minor for the duration of the 100-day claim filing
period; 0 (3) the injured party was physically or mentally incapacitated
for the duration of the 100-day period and by reason of such disability
failed to present a timely claim;2' or (4) the injured party died prior
to the expiration of the 100-day period.22  If the court grants relief
from the claim-filing requirement, suit must be commenced within 30
days.23  If the court refuses to grant relief24 and its decision is upheld
on appeal,25 the injured victim is barred from further action since com-
15. CAL. Gov'T CODE §911.6.
16. CAL. GOV'T CODE §911.4.
17. CAL. GOV'T CODE §911.4(b).
18. See Ridley v. City & County of San Francisco, 272 Cal. App. 2d 290, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 199 (1969).
19. CAL. Gov'T CODE §946.6(c)(1).
20. CAL. Gov'T CODE §946.6(c) (2).
21. CAL. Gov'T CODE §946.6(c) (3).
22. CAL. Gov'T CODE §946.6(c) (4).
23. CAL. GOV'T CODE §946.6(f).
24. Case law under Government Code Sections 911.6 (grant or denial of late claim
application by board) and 946.6 (relief from claim-filing requirement) shows a marked
judicial reluctance to grant relief from the 100-day claim filing requirement. See, e.g.,
Bennett v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. 3d 116, 90 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1970); Ken-
drick v. City of La Mirada, 272 Cal. App. 2d 325, 77 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1969); Martin
v. City of Madera, 265 Cal. App. 2d 84, 70 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1968); Hunter v. County
of Los Angeles, 262 Cal. App. 2d 820, 69 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1968); Hom v. Chico Unified
School Dist., 254 Cal. App. 2d 335, 61 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1967); McGranahan v. Rio Vista
Joint Union High School, 224 Cal. App. 2d 624, 36 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1964); Pope v.
County of Riverside, 219 Cal. App. 2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1963); Gonzales v.
County of Merced, 214 Cal. App. 2d 761, 29 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1963); Wall v. Sonora
Union High School Dist., 240 Cal. App. 2d 870, 50 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1960). Cases de-
cided under earlier claim statute provisions and evidencing the same sort of judicial re-
luctance include Baker v. Cohen, 139 Cal. App. 2d 842, 294 P.2d 518 (1956); Gale v.
County of Santa Barbara, 118 Cal. App. 2d 451, 257 P.2d 1000 (1953); and Johnson
v. City of Glendale, 12 Cal. App. 2d 389, 55 P.2d 580 (1936).
25. Appellate review is limited to a determination of whether or not the trial court
abused its discretion in denying relief. Black v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App.
3d 670, 91 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1970); Martin v. City of Madera, 265 Cal. App. 2d 84,
70 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1968); Pope v. County of Riverside, 219 Cal. App. 2d 649, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 491 (1963).
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pliance with or judicial excuse from the claim requirement 0 is a condi-
tion precedent to a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the matter.2 7
One unfortunate result of the technical bar created by the claim re-
quirement has been that it has prevented recovery on many ostensibly
meritorious claims.
28
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "no state shall. deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.129  California's state constitution simi-
larly provides, "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform opera-
tion,13 0 and "[n]o . . . citizen, or class of citizens, [shall] be granted
privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be
granted to all citizens."'" In essence, these guarantees of equal protec-
tion insure that the laws will have equal application to all persons simi-
larly situated.12  When a statute creates different classifications for per-
sons who are similarly situated without affording equal treatment to
those classes, the presence of an equal protection violation may be ar-
gued.33 Public entity claim statutes effect a classification of tort vic-
tims into two groups: victims of "private" torts and victims of "public"
26. Judicial excuse from the requirement that the plaintiff file a claim before he
may be allowed to bring suit may be given only after he has made a fruitless attempt
to be permitted to file a late claim. Ridley v. City & County of San Francisco, 272
Cal. App. 2d 290, 292-93, 77 Cal. Rptr. 199, 200-01 (1969).
27. CAL. Gov'T CODE §905.2. See, e.g., County of San Luis Obispo v. Ranchita
Cattle Co., 16 Cal. App. 3d 383, 94 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1971); Dorow v. Santa Clara County
Flood Control Dist., 4 Cal. App. 3d 389, 84 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970); Ridley v. City &
County of San Francisco, 272 Cal. App. 2d 290, 77 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1969); Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Claude Fisher Co., 161 Cal. App. 2d 431, 327 P.2d 78 (1958); Willis
v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1969).
28. "It is apparent that at least one result of the claims statutes is to provide public
entities with a technical but nevertheless complete defense to many actions brought
against them. This, of course, was not the intended purpose of claims procedure." Van
Alstyne, Recommendation and Study Relating to the Presentation of Claims Against
Public Entities, 2 CAL. LAW REvISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
STUDIES A-1, A-73 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne]. See, e.g., Roberts v.
State, 39 Cal. App. 3d 844, 114 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1974); Clark v. City of Compton, 22
Cal. App. 3d 522, 99 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1971); Lewis v. City & County of San Francisco,
21 Cal. App. 3d 339, 98 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1971); Bennett v. City of Los Angeles, 12
Cal. App. 3d 116, 90 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1970).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
30. CAL. CONsT. art. I, §11.
31. CAL. CONST. art. I, §21.
32. [T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and un-
reasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, noth-
ing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials
to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus
to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger
numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws
will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
33. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
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or "governmental" torts. 4  Because members of the latter class are
denied the relief which is available to members of the former class
under the same circumstances, the tort claim statute is subject to an
equal protection challenge.
A. Test to be Applied
The standard of judicial review in equal protection cases has tradi-
tionally depended on the type of interest affected by the law under
scrutiny. If the legislation has been based upon a "suspect classifica-
tion,"35 such as race, 36 alienage, 37 or nationality,8 8 or if it has affected
a "fundamental freedom," such as the right to vote,89 the right to wor-
ship freely,40 or the right to travel from one state to another, 4' the
statute has been subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. This strict stand-
ard requires a demonstration that a statutory classification is "neces-
sary" to promote a "compelling state interest. ' 42  Implicit in this de-
mand is a requirement that the class be narrowly tailored to promote
that state interest.
43
In contrast, classifications which are not "suspect" and that affect in-
terests which are not regarded as "fundamental" have traditionally
been judged by a much more lenient standard. This lenient standard
has been termed the "rational basis" test and has been described by
the United States Supreme Court in the following manner: "The dis-
tinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear some rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as violative of
the equal protection clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated
to the pursuit of that goal." '44
Under traditional reasoning the public entity claim statutes would
most probably be judged by the rational basis test.45  The statutes rep-
34. The effect of the claim requirement may also be stated in the converse: it
classifies tortfeasors as "public" or "governmental" tortfeasors and "private" tortfeasors.
See Reich v. State Hwy. Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 623, 194 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1972).
35. See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-59 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
36. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
37. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
38. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
39. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Harper v. Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
40. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
41. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
42. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 644 (1969); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 795 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
43. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969).
44. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (emphasis
added).
45. But see Downing & Tehin, The Constitutional Infirmity of the California Gov-
ernment Claim Statute, 1 PnPPRmIN- L. REv. 209, 216-17 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
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resent essentially economic legislation which draws a distinction be-
tween victims of "private" torts and victims of "public" or "govern-
mental" torts, thereby affecting their respective abilities to seek finan-
cial compensation for injuries wrongfully inflicted. The former class
may seek compensation for their injuries at any time within the period
allowed by the statute of limitations applicable to their cause of ac-
tion.4 6  Members of the latter class, however, must file a written, veri-
fied claim for damages within 100 days of their injury.47  Since the
rational basis test requires little more than a "rhyme or reason" for the
legislative classification,4" the claim statute would probably be upheld
as constitutional under this test.49
More recent case law, however, indicates that the old, "hands-off"
approach for essentially economic legislation may be giving way to a
more demanding standard of review. 5° The fountainhead of this line
of decisions is Reed v. Reed,51 a United States Supreme Court case
which dealt with a statute governing the appointment of administrators
for the estates of intestates. The challenged statutes required that pref-
erence be given to a male relative when both a male and a female
of the same degree of kinship sought the office of administrator. The
Reed petitioner objected to the classification, which effectively pro-
hibited her from serving as administratrix of her son's estate, on the
grounds that it denied her equal protection of the law. It might be
inferred that this classification was based on the rationale that men
were generally supposed to have more business expertise than women
and were therefore better qualified for the position of administrator.
However, the sole argument advanced by the state in support of the
classification was that without this means of expeditiously selecting an
administrator, the dockets of the probate courts would become unbear-
ably overloaded with hearings on such matters. 52 Although the statu-
tory scheme did not affect a fundamental freedom or uniquely disad-
Downing], for an argument that access to the courts could perhaps be regarded as a
"fundamental interest," which would compel strict judicial scrutiny of statutes affecting
that interest. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); CONSTrrTI ON OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1527 (L.S. Jayson ed., 7th ed. 1973).
46. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §337.1 (four-year statute of limitations for su-
ing for damages from persons performing or furnishing design or construction).
47. There are also provisions for seeking permission from the defendant entity to
file a late claim, and for seeking judicial excuse from the claim-filing requirement. See
text accompanying notes 16-27 supra, 186-188 infra.
48. Goeseart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
49. The likelihood of such an outcome is attested to by cases which have summar-
ily dismissed equal protection challenges to the claim requirement. See note 5 supra.
50. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. Rnv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
51. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
52. Id. at 76.
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vantage a suspect class,53 the ostensibly logical reason Idaho advanced
for its statute was found to be insufficient, and a unanimous Court
struck down the statute, proclaiming it an unconstitutional denial of
equal protection:
[TI]his Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat different
classes of persons in different ways. The Equal Protection Clause
of that amendment does, however, deny to States the power to
legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by
a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly un-
related to the objective of that statute. A classification "must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike."54
Cases decided on the federal level since Reed indicate that the equal
protection test enunciated therein is still viable as applied to essentially
economic legislation.55 More importantly, for purposes of this discus-
sion, in Brown v. Merlo56 the California Supreme Court utilized the
53. The stricter standard of review employed in Reed might also be explained on
grounds that the classification involved was drawn on the basis of sexual characteristics;
two years after Reed five of the nine Justices were willing to call sex a suspect classifica-
tion, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). But see Geduldig v. Aiello,
94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974). The presence in Reed of what might be termed the "personal
rights" involved in determining who should administer a loved one's estate might also
be noted as a factor to be considered in determining what standard of review should
apply.
54. 404 U.S. at 75-76 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
55. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972), phrased the equal
protection question in terms of whether there was an appropriate governmental interest
suitably furthered by the differential treatment imposed by a city ordinance upon non-
labor picketers as opposed to labor picketers. The stricter standard of review might be
attributed to the fact that the case touched on first amendment rights. However, the
Court alluded to Reed in its decision and analyzed the case in terms of equal protection
principles: "Because Chicago treats some picketing differently from others, we analyze
this ordinance in terms of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 94-95. Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1973), al-
luded to the fact that
the Court seems far less willing to speculate as to what unexpressed legitimate
state purposes may be rationally furthered by a challenged statutory classifica-
tion.
The Court's definition of what constitutes the necessary rational relation-
ship between a classification and a legitimate governmental interest seems to
have become slightly, but perceptibly, more rigorous.
The Green court utilized the Reed "substantial relationship" standard of review for a
schoolboard regulation imposing mandatory maternity leave without pay on pregnant
schoolteachers, noting that the compelling state interest test could not be applied because
sex was not a suspect classification. Id. In O'Neill v. Dent the federal district court
described the "new" equal protection test in these terms:
Under this approach courts are constrained to examine the actual empirical re-
lationship between the classification and its lawful object "rather than accept
one hypothetical legislative justification to the exclusion of others" . . . and
also to determine whether there is a less restrictive way to achieve these goals.
364 F. Supp. 565, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (citation omitted). See also Gunther, supra
note 50, at 20.
56. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
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Reed rationale in striking down California's automobile guest statute,
which, like the claim provision, created an unnatural bar to an injured
person's ability to sue for compensation. Rather than prohibiting suit
on a stale claim or making the right to damages contingent upon the
culpability of the host driver, the guest statute provided that an auto-
mobile passenger could not recover damages for negligently inflicted
injuries unless he had given some consideration for the ride. The stat-
ute had traditionally been justified on two grounds: the prevention of
fraud (collusive suits)1 7 and the protection of hospitality. 8 Weighing
these justifications against the fact that an injured party was prohibited
from seeking compensation, the court concluded,
[The classification created by the statute] is far -too gross and over-
inclusive to be justified by this end since the statute bars the great
majority of valid suits along with the fraudulent claims ...
. . . The courts may and should take cognizance of fraud and
collusion when found to exist in a particular case. However, the
fact that there may be a greater opportunity for fraud or collusion
in one class of cases than another does not warrant courts of law in
closing the door to all cases of that class. Courts must depend upon
the efficacy of the judicial processes to ferret out the meritorious
from the fraudulent in particular cases. 59
In addressing the classifications created by this essentially "economic"
legislation, the court spoke in terms of the necessity for narrowly-drawn
classifications."0 This is an important departure from the "rational
basis" test as it was formerly known.
Since California's public entity claim statutes prevent recovery in a
manner similar to the guest statute, the two types of statutes are suf-
ficiently analogous to permit application of the Brown court's rationale
to an analysis of the classifications created by the public entity claim
statutes. Those provisions make the scope of an injured person's rem-
edies depend upon whether he was injured by a "private" or a "public"
tortfeasor. If a "public" tortfeasor inflicts the injury, a tort victim can-
not recover any damages unless he complies with or is excused from
the requirement that he file a written claim within 100 days. Since
the Reed "substantial relationship" equal protection analysis was held
to be the appropriate standard of review for the classifying effect of
57. Id. at 873, 506 P.2d at 224-25, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 400-01.
58. Id. at 864, 506 P.2d at 218, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
59. Id. at 859, 874, 506 P.2d at 215, 225, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 391, 401 (citations
omitted).
60. Id. at 876, 506 P.2d at 227, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
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the automobile guest statute, it should also be applied in scrutinizing
the analogous governmental tort claim statute.
If the Reed analysis is to be the appropriate standard of review for
the public entity claim requirements, it is necessary to examine the jus-
tifications offered in support of these provisions and to determine
whether the class created by the statutes is sufficiently narrow to pro-
mote the state interest allegedly supporting the claim requirements
without denying equal protection of the law to those within the class.
B. Justifications Advanced
1. Prompt Investigation
Perhaps the most frequently stated justification for the 100-day writ-
ten claim requirement is that it provides the government with an oppor-
tunity to make early investigation of the claim while the facts are still
fresh 1 Early investigation is supposed to foster the prompt settlement
of those claims that the investigation discloses to be meritorious.6 2 The
public treasury, in turn, is theoretically spared the expense of need-
lessly litigating a claim which is fraudulent 3 or for which settlement
is the wiser alternative.
64
However, a problem frequently engendered by compliance with the
claim requirement raises serious questions about the early-investigation
rationale. Often, an attorney must file a grossly inflated estimate of
damages in order to effectively protect the interests of his client. If
he did not, unforeseen damages might ultimately accrue which would
not be encompassed by the tendered claim. A huge claim of this
nature will probably be rejected by the entity against which it is filed.""
As rejected claims would seem to deter settlement negotiations and en-
61. Viles v. State, 66 Cal. 2d 24, 423 P.2d 818, 56 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1967); Dias
v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 57 Cal. 2d 502, 370 P.2d 334, 20 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1962);
Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal. 2d 661, 177 P.2d 558 (1947); Arbios v. County
of San Bernardino, 110 Cal. 553, 42 P. 1080 (1895); Bozaich v. State, 32 Cal. App.
3d 688, 108 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1973); C.A. Magistretti Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 27
Cal. App. 3d 270, 103 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1972); Sheeley v. City of Santa Clara, 215 Cal.
App. 2d 83, 30 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1963); Hochfelder v. County of Los Angeles, 126 Cal.
App. 2d 370, 272 P.2d 844 (1954).
62. For a suggestion that in practice it is frequently the case that even meritorious
claims are routinely denied rather than considered for settlement at all, see Downing,
supra note 45, at 224-26.
63. Artukovich v. Astendorf, 21 Cal. 2d 329, 339, 131 P.2d 831, 837 (1942) (Ed-
monds, J., dissenting); Arbios v. County of San Bernardino, 110 Cal. 553, 555, 42 P.
1080, 1081 (1895). See also Van Alystyne, Claims Against Public Employees: More
Chaos in California Law, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 497, 532 (1961).
64. Dias v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 57 Cal. 2d 502, 503, 370 P.2d 334, 335,
20 Cal. Rptr. 630, 631 (1962); Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal. 2d 661, 667,
177 P.2d 558, 562 (1947); Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
207 Cal. 430, 437, 278 P. 1028, 1030 (1929); Hochfelder v. County of Los Angeles,
126 Cal. App. 2d 370, 374, 272 P.2d 844, 847 (1954).
65. See Downing, supra note 45, at 224-26.
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courage litigation, it appears that the 100-day limitation may actually
defeat the professed purpose of early investigation by increasing the
quantum of public funds expended in resolving an individual's claim.
Another of the purported aims of early investigation is the detection
of fraudulent claims against the public treasury.6 6 Prevention of fraud-
ulent or collusive lawsuits has long been cited as one justification for
laws that classify. 7  In Brown v. Merlo65 the state offered precisely
that rationale in support of the classifications drawn by the automobile
guest statute. Rejecting the argument, the court noted that it had
found similar "anticollusion' justifications "insufficient to support sig-
nificantly narrower classification schemes."'69  As previously dis-
cussed, an analogy can be drawn between the government claim pro-
visions and the automobile guest statute in that under both statutes
meritorious claims otherwise competent of judicial resolution70 are
barred along with the fraudulent ones. To the extent that this occurs,
the classification appears "too gross and overinclusive" to satisfy equal
protection requirements.
Even if it were assumed that a tenuous relationship exists between
the conservation of the state's funds, the prevention of fraudulent law-
suits, and the 100-day limitation, there are strong countervailing public
policy considerations which should be considered in judging the ef-
ficacy of the tort claim requirement. Public policy clearly favors the
hearing of legitimate grievances 71 in order that injured persons may be
made whole. Therefore, to the extent that a person's injuries go unre-
compensed solely because the claim requirement works to suppress
their otherwise timely airing, public policy should call for a modifica-
tion of the claim requirement as it now stands.
Two cases particularly suggestive of this need are McGranahan v.
Rio Vista Joint Union High School72 and Wall v. Sonora Union High
66. See authorities cited note 63 supra.
67. For example, the rule of intrafamilial tort immunity, which classified tort vic-
tims on the basis of whether or not they were related to the tortfeasor, was justified
as a measure designed to prevent collusive suits. The California Supreme Court rejected
that justification and struck down the doctrine in Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 431,
289 P.2d 218, 225 (1955). A similar justification was advanced for interspousal tort
immunity and parental immunity from tort liability to their own children. In Klein v.
Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 695-96, 376 P.2d 70, 72-73, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104-05 (1962),
the court rejected this justification for the classification wrought by the interspousal im-
munity doctrine, and abolished the rule in California. In Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.
3d 914, 919-20, 923, 479 P.2d 648, 651-52, 654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291-92, 294 (1971),
the doctrine of parental immunity met a similar fate.
68. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1973).
69. Id. at 861, 506 P.2d at 215, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
70. In other words, not barred by the statute of limitations that would be applicable
if the tortfeasor were a private party.
71. See Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles, 249 Cal. App. 2d 976, 979, 58 Cal. Rptr.
20, 23 (1967).
72. 224 Cal. App. 2d 624, 36 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1964).
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School District.7" McGranahan concerned a child who received an eye
injury which allegedly resulted from negligent supervision by school
personnel. Since the injury appeared minor, his parents did not take
any action against the school within the 90-day claim filing period then
in effect. Six months later, however, cataracts developed from the in-
jury that had appeared so innocuous, and the child ultimately had to
have his eye removed. Since the plaintiff had failed to file a claim
within 90 days of the accident, the defendant's motion for summary
judgment was granted and affirmed on appeal. 74  The Wall case also
involved negligent supervision, the child sustaining brain damage that
was not capable of being fully diagnosed until 13 months after the ac-
cident. Again, summary judgment for defendants was affirmed due
to plaintiffs failure to file a written claim for damages within 90 days
of the incident.
75
Public policy favors the hearing and resolution of just claims. 76 It
sanctions the notion that where a wrong has occurred, an adequate
remedy should be available. 77  Our tort law is premised on the idea
that one who injures another should be held responsible for making
him whole again. The public entity claim provisions create a "techni-
cal but nevertheless complete defense 781 which persists in direct con-
travention to these fundamental public policy considerations. In at-
tempting to strike a balance between the alleged needs of government
and the needs of persons who have been injured or damaged by gov-
ernment agents, these public policy considerations deserve a heavy
weight on the injured parties' side of the scales.
From the foregoing it would appear that the interests purportedly
served by prompt investigation do not bear the necessary relation 0 to
the classification created by the 100-day claim requirement. Addition-
ally, the goal to be attained 'by prompt investigation, in and of itself,
can apparently be accomplished today without the aid of a 100-day
limitation. As the Michigan Supreme Court observed in Grubaugh v.
City of St. Johns,0 a decision which found due process infirmities in
a 60-day claim filing requirement,
73. 240 Cal. App. 2d 870, 50 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1966).
74. 224 Cal. App. 2d at 627, 631, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 799, 802.
75. 240 Cal. App. 2d at 874, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
76. See Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles, 249 Cal. App. 2d 976, 979, 58 Cal. Rptr.
20, 23 (1967).
77. "It is a settled and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must
have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 87, 93 (1803).
78. Van Alstyne, supra note 28, at A-73.
79. See text accompanying notes 50-60 supra.
80. 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970).
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Even if we assume the above original policy considerations were
once valid, today they have lost their validity and ceased to exist
due to changed circumstances. In recent years most governmental
units and agencies have purchased liability insurance as author-
ized by statute. In addition -to insurance investigators, they have
police departments and full-time attorneys at their disposal to
promptly investigate the causes and effects of accidents . . . . As
a result these units and agencies are better prepared to investigate
and defend negligence suits than are most private tortfeasors to
whom no special notice provisions have been granted by the legis-
lature. 81
Therefore it would seem that the only result the 100-day limitation ac-
tually accomplishes is the exclusion from the courtroom of otherwise
justiciable claims.
2. Correct Offending Condition
A second rationale advanced for the 100-day written claim require-
ment is that the claim gives the defendant agency prompt notice of the
offending condition so that the agency can make necessary alterations
or repairs and thus prevent further injuries.8 2 This is a laudable objec-
tive when the claim stems from an allegedly dangerous or defective
condition of property, and to the end of correcting such conditions the
claim statute serves a needed, or at least beneficial, purpose. But the
rationale is more difficult to sustain in the case of a personal injury
arising from, a government employee's negligent or intentional tort,
when the victim's injury is caused by a single act rather than by a condi-
tion which can be corrected.
83
If equal protection principles now require more narrowly drawn
classes in the field of economic legislation, some alteration of California
claim procedure would appear to be in order. One possibility would
be to redraft the statute to require a claim only when the claimant's
injury stems from a dangerous or defective condition of public property
and to eliminate the requirement for injuries stemming from negligent
or intentional torts of public employees. However, the practical feasi-
bility of this solution is questionable. In many situations a claimant
might determine that he was injured because of a given party's negli-
gent conduct, while the public entity could argue that a dangerous or
defective condition was responsible for the injury and that therefore
a notice of claim should have been given. This would necessitate a
81. Id. at 177, 180 N.W.2d at 784.
82. See Bozaich v. State, 32 Cal. App. 3d 688, 697, 108 Cal. Rptr. 392, 398
(1973). See also Van Alstyne, supra note 28, at A-73.
83. See Van Alstyne, supra note 28, at A-74.
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hearing on the issue of whether the plaintiff's injury was caused by a
correctable condition or by tortious conduct. Since a finding that a cor-
rectable condition caused the injury would 'be a determination of fail-
ure to comply with the claim requirement, the end result of such a
scheme would appear to be no different from the situation that prevails
under the current claim procedure: the only way a prospective plaintiff
could assure himself of the opportunity to litigate his claim would be
by filing a notice of claim within the period prescribed by statute, de-
spite the fact that he had made a good faith determination that his
injury was not within the class for which the statute prescribed a notice
of claim.
Perhaps a more workable solution could be achieved by approaching
the problem from the standpoint of the relief provisions. If the courts
were required to grant relief from the claim filing requirement unless
the public entity could demonstrate that the plaintiff's injury was oc-
casioned by a defective or dangerous condition of public property, then
the class of persons burdened with the claim requirement would be
narrowed to include only those whose compliance with the claim re-
quirement would serve the legitimate state interest of correcting of-
fending conditions before further injuries were sustained because of
them.
3. Fiscal Planning
California case law divulges that a third justification is frequently ad-
vanced for the classification created by the claim statutes.A4 This justi-
fication centers on the rationale that the claim requirement is necessary
for government fiscal planners, who require notice of potential tort
claims in order to intelligently plan for future expenditures. The ex-
planation first appeared in the late nineteenth century,85 when public
policy as well as the law apparently frowned upon the idea of govern-
mental bodies 'buying insurance to cover tort liability.A6
Today some governmental entities purchase liability insurance.87
Others, such as the State of California, are self-insurers.88 As to the
84. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 207 Cal. 430, 278
P. 1028 (1929); Arbios v. San Bernardino County, 110 Cal. 553, 42 P. 1080 (1895);
Hochfelder v. County of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 2d 370, 272 P.2d 844 (1954).
85. Arbios v. San Bernardino County, 110 Cal. 553, 42 P. 1080 (1895).
86. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 984-85 (4th ed. 1971) for a discussion
of early twentieth century case law on the question of whether expenditure of public
funds for liability insurance for government agencies constituted an ultra vires act be-
cause the agencies enjoyed the protective shield of sovereign immunity.
87. Government Code Section 990 explicitly provides statutory authority for public
entities in California to purchase liability insurance coverage coextensive with the scope
of their substantive liability.
88. Interview with Jack L. Burrows, Claims Coordinator for the California Dep't
of Justice, Sacramento, Cal., Aug. 20, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Burrows].
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entities that purchase insurance, an argument can be made that the
fiscal-planning rationale no longer applies; insurance premiums are cal-
culated on the basis of past settlements or judgments paid, not on the
basis of potential claims.8 9 As to the self-insurer, the justification is
also questionable since, at least at the state level, the annual budget-
ary appropriation for tort claims has habitually been approximately half
of the amount which is actually paid to claimants. 90 Since tort damages
are necessarily speculative until set by the judiciary or 'by negotiated
settlement between the parties, it does not seem that knowledge of pos-
sible claims would have any significant impact on fiscal planning by the
government. The Reed standard of equal protection review would ap-
pear to require a more substantial relationship between the classifica-
tion and its purported reason than is furnished by the planning ration-
ale.
4. Sovereign Immunity Principle
Still another explanation occasionally advanced for the government
claim statute is that it constitutes the set of conditions upon which the
sovereign, in creating exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity
from tort liability,91 has consented to be sued. 92  The argument runs
as follows: The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that a state (and by necessary implication, its political subdi-
visions) may be sued only with its own consent. Therefore, when the
state consents to be sued, it is within its prerogative, as sovereign, to
impose whatever conditions it desires upon the privilege granted.
89. See Downing, supra note 45, at 229.
90. Burrows, supra note 88. The annual budget appropriations for the last four
fiscal years have been relatively static: $1,410,000 for 1974-75 [CAL. STATS. 1974, c.
375, §2, Item 48]; $1,100,000 for 1973-74 [CAL. STATS. .1973, c. 129, §2, Item 48);
$1,000,000 for 1972-73 [CAL. STAT. 1972, c. 156, §2, Item 46, at 230-31]; and
$1,000,000 for 1971-72 [CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 266, §2, Item 45, at 437]. The language
in each of these appropriations provides that the appropriations are for the
administration, investigation, adjustment, defense and payment of tort liability
claims, settlements, compromises, and judgments against the state, its officers,
servants and employees, ... or for the purchase of insurance protecting the
state, its officers, servants and employees against such tort liability claims
Mr. Burrows indicated that he is generally able to make the annual appropriation last
about five to seven months into the fiscal year; thereafter funds must be procured by
special appropriations.
91. Strictly speaking, "sovereign immunity" refers to immunity of the state govern-
ment from suit, while "governmental immunity" is the proper term for the same type
of immunity at local government level. See 8 U. RicHOND L. REv. 372 (1974). For
purposes of convenience, the terms are used interchangeably in this comment.
92. Artukovich v. Astendorf, 21 Cal. 2d 329, 131 P.2d 831 (1942); Roberts v.
State, 39 Cal. App. 3d 844, 114 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1974); Bozaich v. State, 32 Cal. App.
3d 688, 108 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1973); Wadley v. County of Los Angeles, 205 Cal. App.
2d 668, 23 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1962); Johnson v. City of Glendale, 12 Cal. App. 2d 389,
55 P.2d 580 (1936).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 6
This contention may be accurate to the extent that it does not exceed
constitutional limitations on the state legislature's power to impose con-
ditions on state-granted privileges,93 but its foundation is weak. The
sovereign immunity concept of the eleventh amendment is like a crea-
ture from the legal deep; no one seems to know quite from whence
it came. 94 Several jurisdictions, including California, have attested to
the doctrine's weak foundation by continually questioning its validity
over the last two decades. 95 Fourteen years ago, in Muskopf v. Corn-
ing Hospital District,96 the California Supreme Court stated,
After a reevaluation of the rule of governmental immunity from
tort liability we have concluded that it must be discarded as mis-
taken and unjust.
The rule of governmental immunity for tort is an anachronism,
-without rational basis, and has existed only by the force of inertia.
In formulating "rules" and "exceptions" we are apt to forget
that when there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the
exception.9
7
This language impels close scrutiny of the traces of common law
sovereign immunity principles which persist in the law today. 8 It is
submitted that public entity tort claim statutes are little more than ves-
tiges of that ancient, anachronistic doctrine;' 9 as such, they are ripe for
repeal.
C. Recent Case Law
To date, two state supreme courts have found their government
claim requirements to be unconstitutional denials of equal protection.
93. CAL. CONST. art. III, §5: "Suits may be brought against the state in such man-
ner and in such courts as shall be directed by law." Cf., Bozaich v. State, 32 Cal. App.
3d 688, 697, 108 Cal. Rptr. 392, 397 (1973). See text accompanying note 141 infra.
94. See Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 214-16, 359 P.2d 457,
458-60, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90-92 (1961); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 512-18 (1898); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 970-87 (4th ed.
1971).
95. W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS 977 (4th ed. 1971). See also Note, Govern-
mental Immunity from Tort Liability: Has The Rationale Disappeared?, 39 U.M.K.C.L.
REv. 252 (1971).
96. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
97. Id. at 213, 216, 219, 359 P.2d at 458, 460, 462, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 90, 92, 94
(emphasis added).
98. See Note, Governmental Immunity From Tort Liability: Has The Rationale
Disappeared?, 39 U.M.K.C.L. Rlv. 252, 254-55 (1971), for a brief treatment of the
ideological weaknesses underlying the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United
States.
99. "The claim-filing requirements of the Government Code are directly related to
the doctrine of governmental immunity and exist for the benefit of the state ... 
Bozaich v. State, 32 Cal. App. 3d 688, 698, 108 Cal. Rptr. 392, 398 (1973).
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In the 1972 case of Reich v. State Highway Department,100 the Michigan
Supreme Court struck down a 60-day claim requirement. Noting that
the claim provision had been enacted as part of a statutory scheme for
general public liability, the court observed that the effect of the claim
requirement was to arbitrarily create artificial subclasses within the nat-
ural classes of tortfeasors and tort victims.' 0 ' Since the professed pur-
pose of Michigan's public liability act had been to make the govern-
ment's tort liability coextensive with private parties' and thereby create a
general rule of government liability subject to statutory exception, the
distinction that the tort claim provision drew between the public and pri-
vate sectors was irrational in the sense of being out of harmony with
the statutory framework which supported it. As to tortfeasors, the
court observed,
This diverse treatment of members of a class along the lines of
government or private tortfeasors bears no reasonable relationship
under today's circumstances to the recognized purpose of the
act. It constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable variance in
'the treatment of both portions of one natural class and is, there-
fore, barred by the constitutional guarantees of equal protection.' 02
In a like manner the court acknowledged that the statute arbitrarily dis-
tinguished between "private" and "public" tort victims, and held that
"[t]he notice requirement acts as a special statute of limitations which
arbitrarily bars the actions of the victims of governmental negligence.
. .. Such arbitrary treatment clearly violates the equal protection guar-
antees of our State and Federal Constitutions.'10 3  A year later Nevada
followed Michigan court's analysis and invalidated its six-month public
entity claim-filing requirement0 4 on equal protection grounds. 0 5
Roberts v. State'01 is the most recent case to address the constitution-
ality of California's government claim requirement. The petitioner
urged a state appellate court to adopt the rationale of the Michigan and
Nevada cases and to declare California's statute constitutionally invalid
as a denial of equal protection. The court refused to follow either case,
stating that since California's statutory provisions for public liability and
actions against the government' 07 (hereinafter referred to collectively as
100. 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
101. Id. at 623, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 623-24, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
104. Nevada Revised Statutes Section 244.250 required that a claim be filed within
six months of accrual of a cause of action. Section 244.245 made filing of such a claim
a condition precedent to ability to bring suit on the matter.
105. Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev.,'Adv. Op. 78, 510 P.2d 879 (1973).
106. 39 Cal. App. 3d 844, 114 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1974).
107. CAL. Gov'T CODa div. 3.6 (commencing with §810).
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the Public Liability Act) were not enacted with the intent of creating
general liability for government, 08 but rather were enacted to create
express statutory liability in given situations while otherwise preserving
general immunity principles,"0 9 the reasoning of the other jurisdictions
was inapplicable."10
This rationale, it is submitted, falls far short of responsible, in-depth
equal protection analysis. Whether the California Public Liability Act
creates general liability for government or repudiates the Muskopi v.
Corning Hospital District"' decision and reaffirms the principle of gov-
ernmental tort immunity appears to 'be irrelevant. The claims statutes
still effect a classification between government and private tort victims
and impose on the former class the burden of complying with a special
statute of limitations. Therefore, under the Reed line of cases the
judiciary must examine the classification and determine whether the
reasons advanced for its existence bear "a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation.""'  However, rather than examining
the justifications for the 100-day claim requirement, the Roberts court
looked to the general nature of the California Public Liability Act.
The court found that the statutory scheme was enacted for the purpose
of preserving limited governmental liability and held that the claim pro-
vision was consistent with this purpose." 3  The court clearly failed to
examine the justification for the claim requirement provision itself,
without reference to the purposes that purportedly underlay the Public
Liability Act, and ascertain whether the classification created by the
claim provision was narrowly drawn to promote the purposes which as-
sertedly justified that particular provision.
Equal protection analysis is concerned with the classification effected
by the specific statute under consideration. Having found a classifica-
tion created by the law, the next inquiry is whether the classification
operates to disadvantage the members of one of the classes created." 4
As previously discussed, the claim requirement does disadvantage
members of the class of "victims of public torts." The next question,
therefore, must be directed to the state's justification for the burden-
some treatment imposed by the statutory classification. As the Reed
Court phrased it, the task of the judiciary is to determine whether the
108. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 521. But see Comment, Govern-
mental Liability for Torts of Employees-The End of Sovereign Immunity in California,
5 SA rA CLARA LAw. 81 (1964).
109. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
110. Id. at 849-50, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
111. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
112. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
113. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
114. Yick Wo v, Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367-68 (1886).
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classification "rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation.""'
Applying this rationale to its analysis of the guest statute in Brown
v. Merlo, the California Supreme Court stated,
The primary concern of -the "equal protection" guarantee of our
state and federal Constitutions, however, is that "persons similarly
situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive
like treatment" . . . and we believe .that . . . the guest statute's
wholesale elimination of causes of action fails to provide such "like
treatment" for "similarly situated" individuals. 11
Brown held that the guest statute presented a "classic case" of an "im-
permissibly overinclusive classification scheme."' " 7 Similarly, the pub-
lic entity claim provisions create an impermissibly overinclusve classi-
fication by barring from the courtroom all actions against public entities
unless the prospective plaintiff has complied with the claim requirement,
even though the claim is not needed for purposes of "prompt investiga-
tion,"1 8 there is no "offending condition" to correct, 19 and the entity
habitually neglects to "plan" for its pending tort liabilities.
02
Judicial response to the equal protection challenges launched against
California's public entity claim requirement has been couched in terms
of deference to the legislature's prerogative as policy maker under the
separation of powers doctrine.' 2 ' In this vein, the Roberts court stated
that
[t]he argument in plaintiff's closing brief that "when the state
undertakes to divest itself from the cloak of immunity it must stand
on an equal basis with other similarly situated tortfeasors" would
have merit only if the California Legislature so provided, or if some
legislative action indicated that the reasons for the claims statute
no longer had compelling force.'
22
But it is the separation of powers doctrine which provides the court
with the basis to consider the equal protection problem. In the words
of Justice Marshall, "[ilt is, emphatically, the province and duty of the
judicial department, to say what the law is."1' 28  The judiciary, no less
115. 404 U.S. at 75.
116. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 876, 506 P.2d 212, 227, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 403 (1973).
117. Id.
118. See text accompanying notes 61-81 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 84-90 supra.
121. See, e.g., Dias v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 57 Cal. 2d 502, 504, 370 P.2d
334, 335, 20 Cal. Rptr. 630, 631 (1962); Roberts v. State, 39 Cal. App. 3d 844, 850,
114 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1974); Lewis v. City & County of San Francisco, 21 Cal. App.
3d 339, 340-41, 98 Cal. Rptr. 407, 408 (1971).
122. 39 Cal. App. 3d 844, 849, 114 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 (1974).
123. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87, 111 (1803).
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than the legislature, is not only competent, but duty-bound to judge
whether or not "the reasons for the claims statute [still have] compel-
ling force."
THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE
Both the United States and California Constitutions limit the power
of government to act in an arbitrary or unfair manner by provid-
ing in their respective due process clauses124 that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The
dividing line between what is "due process of law" and what is not "due
process of law" is difficult to ascertain. Perhaps more than in any
other segment of constitutional law, the questions that arise in the due
process area lend themselves to resolution on a case-by-case basis. As
the United States Supreme Court has stated, "'Due process' is an elu-
sive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content
varies according to specific factual contexts."'12 5
A. Substantive Due Process
In the 1970 case of Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 20 the Supreme
Court of Michigan dealt with the question whether a 60-day public en-
tity tort claim requirement violated due process as to minors and per-
sons incompetent to bring an action. Plaintiff, a minor, had been per-
manently blinded as a result of injuries suffered in an automobile acci-
dent on an allegedly defective public road. Within the normal, two-
year period of limitation for personal injury actions, the boy's guardian
brought suit against the city,12 7 which moved to dismiss the complaint
on the basis of plaintiff's failure to comply with the 60-day claim re-
quirement.
128
Noting that the substantive due process guarantees of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments do not attach to all interests, but do protect
property rights, the Michigan court found it necessary to ascertain
whether the state's statutory waiver of sovereign immunity resulted in
the imposition of liability on the state and its political subdivisions or
whether the waiver merely amounted to a consent to be sued. If the
law imposed liability, it would create a cause of action for a party in-
124. U.S. Const. amend. V; amend. XIV, §1. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. The due
process guarantee of the California Constitution is "identical in scope and purpose with
the due process clause of the federal constitution." Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App.
3d 1, 20,94 Cal. Rptr. 904, 914 (1971).
125. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
126. 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970).
127. Id. at 168, 180 N.W.2d at 780.
128. Id.
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jured through the fault of a public entity. 2 9 This cause of action was
characterized by the court as a vested property right upon which there
could be no arbitrary impingement. 30 Conversely, if the law were in
essence a consent statute permitting suit against the sovereign in its
own courts, the ability to bring such an action would be a "privilege"
that could be withdrawn as readily as it had been granted.' 3'
The Michigan court characterized the public liability act as a statute
creating liability where governmental immunity had previously barred
causes of action for damages.' 32 Since the law was found to impose
liability rather than merely to afford a forum or create a remedy, a right
to sue the city for damages vested in the plaintiff at the time he sus-
tained his injuries.' 33  The court observed, "Under the statute a plain-
tiff could institute suit on the first or fifty-ninth day after -the injury.
To take away his cause of action on the sixty-first day because he could
not meet the notice provisions of the act would deprive him of a vested
right of action without due process of law."' 34  The state had sought
to counter any finding of arbitrariness by asserting that the statute af-
forded public entities prompt notice and an opportunity to investigate
alleged torts.135 The court replied that such policy considerations as
might once have justified this alleged need to promptly investigate had
lost their validity over the years and, accordingly, "condemn[ed]
the purely capricious and arbitrary exercise of legislative power
whereby a wrongful and highly injurious invasion of rights [was] sanc-
tioned and the litigant who fail[ed] to submit the required notice of claim
[was] stripped of all real remedy."'
31
The persuasiveness'" of Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns is minimal
if it is read as being limited to its facts, since California's claim statutes
provide that a plaintiff who was a minor during the 100-day period
must be granted leave to file a late claim anytime within one year of
the accrual of his cause of action. 3 " However, the text of the Gru-
129. Id. at 171, 180 N.W.2d at 781.
130. Id. at 173, 180 N.W.2d at 781-82.
131. Id. at 171, 180 N.W.2d at 781. But cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
132. 384 Mich. at 173, 180 N.W.2d at 782.
133. Id. at 174-75, 180 N.W.2d at 783.
134. Id. at 175, 180 N.W.2d at 783.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 176, 180 N.W.2d at 784.
137. Since Grubaugh is a product of another state's tribunal, it obviously cannot be
characterized as "authority" for any court in California. The case is offered as an ex-
ample of analysis that a California court could apply to this state's claim provisions.
Although Grubaugh was decided on both federal and state constitutional grounds, recent
federal case law indicates that economic legislation will remain largely untouched by the
United States Supreme Court under substantive due process analysis. North Dakota
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
138. CAL. GOV'T CODE §946.6(c)(2). This leaves untouched, however, the prob-
lem that a minor must file a claim to preserve his cause of action against a governmen-
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baugh decision suggests that the arbitrariness condemned by that court
was not confined to the rights of minors issue, but encompassed the
entire problem that arises when a dividing line is placed between "gov-
ernmental" and "private" tortfeasors (or tort victims). After it found
that the state's waiver of tort immunity had given the plaintiff a vested
property right, the court analyzed the problem in terms of rights of ac-
tion against government agencies, not in terms of the disabled minor's
particular right:
The substantive right to proceed against the governmental tort-
feasor. . . must arise under the same conditions and undiminished
by any special exemption as any other comparable cause of action.
...[W]e hold -that this cause of action is entitled under the
due process clause to the same protection against arbitrary inter-
ference as any other right.' 39
Under the Grubaugh rationale it can be argued that depriving any in-
jured party, whether disabled or not, of a right to bring an action is
an arbitrary act unless there is adequate justification for this depriva-
tion. When the justification advanced for the deprivation is premised
on notions that are no longer viable, it would seem that the arbitrari-
ness fails to dissipate and due process fails to be afforded to those per-
sons whose property rights are affected by the distinction drawn be-
tween governmental and private tortfeasors and their victims.
The extent to which Grubaugh's reasoning could be directly applied
in California depends largely on the nature of California's Public Lia-
bility Act. If the act imposes liability where immunity was previously
the rule, it would seem that a property right which is within the pale of
the due process guarantees must vest in an injured party at the moment
of injury.' 40 If the act is merely a consent to be sued, however, it
would not seem to give rise to a vested right; it must be remembered,
however, that ability to exercise even a state-granted "privilege" may not
be conditioned on a requirement that does not comport with constitu-
tional guarantees.' 4'
The history of common law sovereign immunity in California and the
general tenor of the California Public Liability Act lend some substance
tal tortfeasor, while his minority-status would automatically toll the statute of limitations
until he reached majority if the action were against a private tortfeasor.
139. 384 Mich. at 174, 180 N.W.2d at 783.
140. "[W]e conclude that the cause of action here pleaded by plaintiff was an ac-
crued vested right and, as such, is part causa with traditional proprietary rights and is
to be equally protected from arbitrary interference." Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384
Mich. 165, 174-75, 180 N.W.2d 778, 783 (1970).
141. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); O'Neil, Mr. Justice Brennan and
the Condition of Unconstitutional Conditions, 4 RTrrTERS CAMDEN L.J. 58 (1972). But
see Artukovich v. Astendorf, 21 Cal. 2d 329, 131 P.2d 831 (1942).
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to the argument that California's public liability laws impose liability
rather than simply give consent for suit to be brought against the sover-
eign. Until 1961 the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity
shielded public entities from tort liability except where a specific stat-
ute or judicial decision provided for liability. 142 However, in 1961 the
California Supreme Court held, in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dis-
trict,14 3 that the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity was "an
anachronism, without rational basis,"' 44 that the doctrine was sustained
only by the force of inertia, and that its abolition was imperative. The
state legislature responded by imposing a two-year moratorium on pros-
pective plaintiffs' rights to sue,'4 5 while a study was commenced to
determine the best legislative response to the Muskopf decision.
The product of this legislative study is the California Public Liability
Act of 1963, 46 whose basic premise is articulated in section 815 of
the California Government Code: "Except as otherwise provided by
statute . . . [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such
injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public
employee or any other person."'1 4 7 Judicial construction of the statute
has reiterated the basic premise that public liability in California is con-
ditioned on its express statutory provision. 45 It follows that the stat-
utes which "provide otherwise" and form exceptions to the rule in sec-
tion 815 must impose liability on the sovereign, rather than merely em-
body its consent to be sued in its own courts.
Public entity claim procedure in California is governed by provisions
that were added to the code as part of the Public Liability Act, which
imposes liability on public entities by specific statutory pronouncement.
Since the claim requirement is activated only after the prospective
claimant's grievance has been found to come within the bounds of a
code section which imposes liability' 49 and which therefore should
create a right of action, it would seem that the California claim require-
ment should be subjected to the same sort of constitutional scrutiny as
that to which Michigan's claim requirement was subjected in Gru-
baugh.
Even if the statutory exceptions to section 815 do not create a right
142. See Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d 457, 460,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92 (1961).
143. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
144. Id. at 216, 359 P.2d at 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
145. CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 1404, at 3209.
146. CAL. GoV'T CODE div. 3.6 (commencing with §810), as enacted, CAL. STATS.
1963, c. 1681, §1, at 3267.
147. CAL. Gov'r CODE §815(a) (emphasis added).
148. Gonzales v. State, 29 Cal. App. 3d 585, 105 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1972); Susman
v. City of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App. 2d 803, 75 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969); Dat v. City
of Los Angeles, 263 Cal. App. 2d 655, 69 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1968).
149. CAL. GoVT CoD §905.8.
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to sue a public entity for damages in California, the question remains,
in light of developments since Grubaugh, whether the 100-day claim
requirement is consonant with substantive due process limitations on
arbitrariness.1 10 In considering that question, considerable weight
should be given to the fact that the claim requirement frequently bars
the hearing of potentially meritorious claims. Further, the justifications
advanced for the requirement appear, as the Michigan court observed
for that state, to have outlived their usefulness. 5' Perhaps now is the
time to ask why a tort victim should be barred from seeking compensa-
tion for his injuries simply because a "governmental" tortfeasor inflicted
them. A remedy should be available where a wrong has occurred, and
tortfeasors should be held to a standard of responsibility for making
their victims whole again.
B. Procedural Due Process
California's public entity claim statutes may also be vulnerable to a
procedural due process challenge. In five recent cases the United
States Supreme Court has employed an "irrebuttable presumption"
analysis to strike down legislation creating classifications. 1 2 The anal-
ysis proceeds as follows: When a statute imposes a burden upon a
class of individuals for a certain purpose, and some individuals in the
disadvantaged class are so situated that burdening them does not fur-
ther that purpose, then the statutory scheme must be modified, if ad-
ministratively feasible, to provide for a determination of the applicabil-
ity of the statutory presumption to each particular case. The goal of
providing such a procedure is to insure more careful selection of those
who must bear the statutory burden. The legislature is said to have
"conclusively presumed" that the fact which justifies the imposition of
the burden is common to all individuals within the class, and due pro-
cess is said to require that an opportunity be provided to rebut the pre-
sumption. 1
53
To determine whether the irrebuttable presumption doctrine can be
applied to the claim statutes, it is necessary to review the five recent
cases in which the United States Supreme Court has utilized this doc-
trine. The first of these, Bell v. Burson,'54 involved a Georgia statute
150. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
151. See text accompanying notes 79-81, 134-136 supra.
152. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't
of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stan-
ley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
153. Since most legislation classifies to some extent, the use of this doctrine may
be tremendously expanded, as has been noted by vigorous dissenting opinions. See, e.g.,
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 462 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
154. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). The Bell decision does not contain the "conclusive pre-
sumption" language found in the later cases employing this doctrine. However, in later
cases the Supreme Court has characterized Bell as a "conclusive presumption" case. See,
e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973).
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which provided that an uninsured motorist who was involved in an au-
tomobile accident but could not post security for damages would lose
his driver's license without a hearing. The Court held that the state
could not in effect presume that every indigent -motorist who became
involved in an accident was probably at fault and therefore had to be
banished from the public highways in order to "[protect other] claim-
ant[s] from the possibility of an unrecoverable judgment."' 55  Due
process required that a hearing be provided to determine whether there
was a reasonable possibility that a judgment could be returned against
the motorist in the amount claimed against him by the other party to
the accident; upon such a showing, revocation of his driver's license
would not violate his constitutional right to procedural due process. 1 6
The next case considered by the Court was Stanley v. Illinois.157 The
statutory scheme which was found to be deficient in that case provided
that the state would take custody of illegitimate children upon the death
of their mother, and the father would be given no opportunity to show
his fitness to care for the children. The Court held that the state could
not conclusively presume that the father was unfit to raise his children;
instead it was required by the due process guarantees to give him a
hearing on the issue of his fitness as a parent. 158  Vlandis v. Kline, 59
the next case in this area, involved a statute which classified a student
as a nonresident on the basis of his address during the year preceding
his application for admission to the state university. 6 0 The Court
struck down the statute and held that the state could not deny resident
tuition rates to an individual on the basis of an irrebuttable presumption
as to his current residence when the presumed fact was not necessarily
true and a reasonable alternative means was available for determining
the student's actual residence. 16 United States Department of Agri-
culture v. Murry"6 2 dealt with a federal statute that denied food stamps
to any household containing a member over 18 years of age who
had been claimed as a federal income tax dependent for the pre-
vious year by a party who was not eligible for food stamps. This pro-
vision was allegedly enacted to prevent college students who were chil-
dren of wealthy parents from taking advantage of the food stamp pro-
gram, 6 3 and presumed that affected tax dependents' households were
155. 402 U.S. at 540.
156. Id. at 542.
157. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
158. Id. at 658.
159. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
160. The determination for married students was based on their address at the time
of application for admission. Id. at 443.
161. Id. at 452.
162. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
163. Id. at 513.
Pacific Law Journal / Tol. 6
not needy.' 64 Citing Bell, Stanley, and Vlandis, the Court held -that
this "irrebuttable presumption often contrary to fact" was violative of
due process. 6" The Court's development of the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine culminated with Cleveland Board of Education v. La
Fleur.166 Although this case did not involve a statute, it did result from
a school board rule which required a pregnant teacher to take unpaid
maternity leave beginning four months before the birth of her child
and continuing until the start of the semester after the child was three
months old. The presumption reflected here was that "every pregnant
teacher who reache[d] the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy [was]
physically incapable of continuing" to teach.' 67  Finding Bell, Stanley,
Vlandis and Murry controlling, the Court stated, "Thus the conclusive
presumption embodied in these rules, like that in Vlandis, is neither
'necessarily nor universally true,' and is violative of the Due Process
Clause."' 68
It is submitted that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine enunciated
in Bell, Stanley, Vlandis, Murry, and LaFleur can be applied to the
claim statutes. The effect of these statutes is the denial of compensa-
tion to certain individuals for a particular purpose, and implicit in the
assertion of that purpose are certain irrebuttable presumptions.
Depending on the rationale being advanced to support the claim stat-
utes, different presumptions are created. If the "prompt investigation"
rationale is being offered, 6 the presumption is created that all claims
presented after 100 days will be incapable of an investigation adequate
to allow the public entity to settle those claims which are meritorious
and collect that information which is relevant. However, nongovern-
mental tortfeasors are apparently able to conduct investigations and
settle valid suits when a complaint is filed within the period prescribed
by the regular statute of limitations, and public entities are, if anything,
better prepared to investigate claims against them than are private par-
ties.'
7 0
If the rationale offered in defense of the claim statutes is that prompt
notice is required to correct the offending condition, 7 1 a different pre-
sumption arises. Under this rationale it is presumed that any claim
presented after 100 days will prevent the entity from correcting haz-
164. Id. at 511.
165. Id. at 514.
166. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
167. Id. at 644.
168. Id. at 646.
169. See text accompanying notes 61-81 supra.
170. See Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384 Mich. 165, 176, 180 N.W.2d 778, 784
(1970).
171. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
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ardous conditions in time to avert further harm. This may well be true
in certain cases, but again the presumption is irrebuttable, and the
claimant is given no opportunity to show, for example, that the govern-
mental entity was fully informed of the problem' 72 or that there was
no offending condition to correct.173
Finally, if -the rationale offered is that the 100-day claim requirement
is necessary for fiscal planning, the irrebuttable presumption is that
claims submitted more than 100 days after the injury cannot be used
for planning purposes. However, the due process pronouncements
handed down by the United States Supreme Court would seem at least
to require that the claimant be given an opportunity to show that the
entity does have insurance and thus does not plan a budget on the basis
of current claims. 174  Alternatively, the claimant should be allowed to
show that the entity never has budgeted an amount adequate to cover
the claims paid out and thus does not seem to be planning at all.' 7
It can, of course, 'be argued that there are major distinctions between
California's claim statutes and those statutes struck down by the United
States Supreme Court. First, it may be asserted that the irrebuttable
presumptions implicit in the California claim statutes are not apparent
on the face of the provisions themselves, but rather arise upon examina-
tion of the rationale traditionally offered to support the provisions.
This assertion, if accurate, would distinguish the statutes considered in
Bell, Stanley, Vlandis, Murry, and LaFleur from the California claim
statutes.'76  However, in each case the Court has looked beyond the
face of the statute and has examined the legislative purposes asserted
in justification of the statutesY.7 7  Additionally, as the Court in Bell v.
Burson stated when commenting on the general area of due process,
" '[I]n this area . . .we look to substance, not to bare form, to deter-
mine whether constitutional minimums have been honored.' 1178 In
light of this language and the Court's demonstrated willingness to look
172. See, e.g., Bennett v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. 3d 116, 90 Cal. Rptr.
479 (1970).
173. See, e.g., Shaddox v. Melcher, 270 Cal. App. 2d 598, 76 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1969)
(accident involving a state automobile).
174. See text accompanying notes 87 and 89 supra.
175. See text accompanying notes 88 and 90 supra.
176. In Bell, the mandatory suspension requirement could be said to embody a pre-
sumption of fault. In Stanley, a presumption of parental unfitness was manifested by
the statute's command that children become wards of the state. The Vlandis statute's
requirement that the persons who fitted within its confines pay nonresident tuition rates
reflected a presumption of nonresidency. In Murry, the statutory denial of food stamps
connoted a presumption that the applicant had no need for them. The school board's
rule in LaFleur presumed the inability to teach.
177. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640-41, 644; United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. at 512-13; Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 448-51;
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 652; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. at 540.
178. 402 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added), quoting Wilner v. Committee on Character,
373 U.S. 96 (1963).
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beyond the face of the statute, drawing a distinction between Califor-
nia's claim statutes and those measures already invalidated by the Court
would seem to be an analysis more of form than of substance if it is
done on the basis that the presumption inheres in the rationale for the
statute rather than in the statute itself.
It might also be argued that the interest affected by the claim stat-
utes is much less weighty than those interests involved in prior cases. 70
However, an injured person's substantive right to seek recompense for
a wrong is an interest that is accorded great weight in our society's
order of priorities, 180 and is arguably as vital as those rights protected
in Bell, Vlandis, and Murry.
Probably the most important distinction between the claim statutes
and those previously stricken is that a party affected by 'the claim re-
quirement initially has an opportunity to avoid the burden of the pre-
sumption and preserve his cause of action, as it is only through his own
inactivity that the burden is imposed. Perhaps this argument can be
partially answered by examining the fact that in numerous cases the
injured party simply does not recognize the need for an attorney and
therefore does not contact one before the 100-day period has ex-
pired.'18 This was the situation in Roberts v. State,'8 2 the last case to
challenge the statute. If the period of time allowed for filing a claim
is so short that it often passes before an injured party is aware of
this opportunity to preserve his cause of action, 8 3 then it can be
argued that the manner in which the presumption arises under the
claim requirement cannot be completely distinguished from the way
in which the presumptions arose under the statutes in Vlandis and
Murry and the regulation in LaFleur. For purposes of constitutional
analysis, an inadequate opportunity to avoid the burden imposed by the
179. The interest in freedom to travel, Bell v. Burson and Vlandis v. Kline; the in-
terest in raising one's own children, Stanley v. Illinois; the interest in food for survival,
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry; the interest in having children, Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur.
180. "It is, of course, fundamental in the law of torts that any person proximately
injured by the act of another, whether that act be willful or negligent should, in the ab-
sence of statute or compelling reasons of public policy, be compensated." Klein v.
Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694-95, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962) (em-
phasis added).
181. See, e.g., Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal. 2d 468, 426 P.2d 753, 58
Cal. Rptr. 249 (1967); Viles v. State, 66 Cal. 2d 24, 423 P.2d 818, 56 Cal. Rptr. 666
(1967); Bennett v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. 3d 116, 90 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1970);
Shaddox v. Melcher, 270 Cal. App. 2d 598, 76 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1969).
182. 39 Cal. App. 3d 844, 114 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1974).
183. The frequency with which this occurs is illustrated by the wealth of cases that
have been brought by prospective claimants who missed the cut-off date for filing, See
Van Alstyne, supra note 28, at A-73. See also Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66
Cal. 2d 468, 426 P.2d 753, 58 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1967); Viles v. State, 66 Cal. 2d 24,
423 P.2d 818, 56 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1967); Roberts v. State, 39 Cal. App. 3d 844, 114
Cal. Rptr. 518 (1974); Bennett v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. 3d 116, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 479 (1970); Shaddox v. Melcher, 270 Cal. App. 2d 598, 76 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1969).
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presumption may be little better than no opportunity at all. This would
seem to be particularly true when, as courts have noted, the human
tragedy with which the individuals may be preoccupied makes it likely
that their minds are on other matters.'84 Furthermore, in determining
whether the distinction is of constitutional dimensions, the question of
state interest should again be considered. In light of the very ques-
tionable viability of the state interests alleged in support of Californias
claim statutes,' the fact that a person has 100 days from the date of
an injury or even a death in which he can act to avoid the presumption
should not, by itself, suffice to uphold the claim statutes in the face
of a procedural due process challenge.
If California's claim statutes were found to be violative of procedural
due process because of the creation of an irrebuttable presumption
which is not necessarily true, modification of the statutes would be re-
quired to provide for a hearing to determine whether the characteristics
previously presumed are in fact true in each particular case. Propo-
nents of the statutes may contend that section 946.6 of the Government
Code provides for this hearing and thus effectively counters any due
process objection. This provision allows a party to petition the court
for relief from the claim filing requirement on several grounds,8 6 the
most important of which is "that failure to present the claim was
through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."'' 7 Upon
such a finding and a determination that the application to file a late
claim was made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year, the
statute requires the court to grant relief unless the agency shows that it
would be prejudiced thereby.'88 Thus one might argue that a claim-
ant will be denied relief only in those cases in which the justifications
propounded for the claim requirements are actually valid. Regrettably,
however, case law on section 946.6 does not support this contention.
The courts not only require the claimant to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that his delay was reasonable, 8 9 but also that it was
not occasioned solely by ignorance of the claim requirement. 90 The
following language is illustrative: "In such case the burden of show-
ing 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect' is on the mov-
ing party who must meet his burden by a 'preponderance of the evi-
184. Bennett v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. 3d 116, 121, 90 Cal. Rptr. 479,
483 (1970).
185. See text accompanying notes 61-99 supra.
186. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
187. CAL. Gov'r CODE §946.6(c).
188. Id.
189. See Viles v. State, 66 Cal. 2d 24, 29-30, 423 P.2d 818, 822, 56 Cal. Rptr. 666,
670 (1967); Shaddox v. Melcher, 270 Cal. App. 2d 598, 601, 76 Cal. Rptr. 80, 83
(1969).
190. See Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal. 2d 468, 476, 426 P.2d 753, 758,
58 Cal. Rptr. 249, 254 (1967).
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dence.'-"191 A court can deny the requested relief solely because
the application to file a late claim was not made within what it deems
to be a reasonable time.19 It can also deny relief because it finds
that the plaintiff's failure to file within 100 days was not caused by
what it would term "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or reasonable
neglect," as was brutally illustrated in Bennett v. City of Los Angeles.19 3
In that case, the plaintiffs' child had been killed when he was buried
under a cement wall that had been left in a hazardous condition
by the city.' Although a claim was not filed until 119 days after
the accident, the city had been fully informed of the details of the
incident only two days after it had taken place.' 95 Plaintiffs sought
judicial relief after the city had denied their application for leave to
present a late claim, alleging that they had not known of the claim re-
quirement until they consulted an attorney 119 days after their son's
death and that a letter of condolence written to them by the defendant
had led them to believe that the city would take voluntary steps to re-
imburse them. Since it knew of the accident almost immediately, the
city could not possibly have been prejudiced in its effort to prevent fur-
ther tragedies. 196 Similarly, it could not have been prejudiced in its
attempt to investigate, as it already possessed all the information neces-
sary to conduct an investigation. 197  Further, it is difficult to believe
that a delay of 19 days prejudiced its fiscal planning capabilities. Des-
pite all of these considerations, the appellate court failed even to men-
tion prejudice to the city, examining instead only the "sparse nature
of petitioners' showing.""' Logic would seem to suggest that a sparse
showing by plaintiff is better than no showing at all by the public
entity.1
99
191. Shaddox v. Melcher, 270 Cal. App. 2d 598, 600, 76 Cal. Rptr. 80, 82 (1969)
(citations omitted).
192. See Viles v. State, 66 Cal. 2d 24, 28, 423 P.2d 818, 821, 56 Cal, Rptr. 666,
669 (1967), in which the court stated three possible reasons why the trial court could
conceivably have denied relief:
[If it found] (a) the plaintiff had not met the burden of proving that his fail-
ure to present his claim to the board within 100 days was through mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, or (b) that his failure did result
from mistake but nevertheless the application to the board for permission to
file a late claim was not made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year
from the date of the accrual of the cause of action, or (c) that the failure to
file on time was due to mistake but that the state established that it would be
prejudiced by the late filing.
Two of the possible grounds for denying relief required no prejudice to the entity.
193. 12 Cal. App. 3d 116,90 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1970).
194. Id. at 118, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
195. Id.
196. In fact the trial court found that plaintiffs had submitted their late claim within
a "reasonable time" after the 100-day period had expired. Id. at 119, 90 Cal. Rptr. at
481.
197. The trial court also found that the city would not have been prejudiced by the
plaintiffs' late claim. Id.
198. Id. at 120, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
199. See Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal. 2d 468, 426 P.2d 753, 58 Cal.
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It seems apparent, then, that section 946.6 of the Government Code,
as it is being applied, does not provide a hearing on the issue involved
which satisfies procedural due process principles:
The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be "mean-
ingful" and "appropriate to the nature of the case." It is a propo-
sition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which
excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision...
does not meet this standard.
200
It is submitted that if section 946.6 were amended to delete the re-
quired showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or reasonable neglect
by plaintiff and to require courts to grant relief unless the public entity
establishes prejudice in terms of the justifications advanced for the 100-
day claim requirement, the just and compelling demands of due process
would be satisfied.
CONCLUSION
Public entity claim statutes, long castigated as "traps for the unwary"
plaintiff,20 1 frequently achieve the lamentable result of barring an in-
jured party from seeking compensation for his injuries because he has
had the misfortune of sustaining them at the hands of a "governmental"
or "public," rather than "private," tortfeasor. Because of their classify-
ing effect, the statutes are susceptible to challenge on equal protection
grounds, which require, at the very least, that a statute creating two
classes and treating one of them adversely must have a "rational basis"
for its existence. Although the California judiciary has been discour-
agingly unresponsive to such challenges to date,202 the Reed line of deci-
sions would appear to require that a more active standard of review
be used to scrutinize the claim requirement. In the wake of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Brown v. Merlo,20 3 this should
be particularly true in this state. Proper application of -the Reed "sub-
stantial relationship" test should result in a finding that California's
claim statutes, as presently written and applied, violate the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the law to those persons
who are burdened by the requirements.
Substantive and procedural due process infirmities may also lurk
within California's public entity claim law. Since the requirement is
Rptr. 249 (1957); Clark v. City of Compton, 22 Cal. App. 3d 522, 99 Cal. Rptr. 613
(1971); and Shaddox v. Melcher, 270 Cal. App. 2d 598, 76 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1969), for
other cases in which relief was denied without requiring a showing of prejudice.
200. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971).
201. Stewart v. McCollister, 37 Cal. 2d 203, 207, 231 P.2d 48, 50 (1951).
202. See text accompanying notes 107-113 supra.
203. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
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intertwined with statutes which impose liability on public entities, the
Michigan court's substantive due process analysis in Grubaugh v. City
of St. Johns2' 4 might be utilized to find that a cause of action against
the government is a vested property right which is arbitrarily taken
away from its owner by the claim requirement's operation. Realisti-
cally, this would appear to be an unlikely response from a judiciary that
has consistently refused even to perform in-depth scrutiny of the more
obvious equal protection problem. Procedural due process principles,
however, may not be so easily ignored. The United States Supreme
Court's findings of procedural due process infirmities in Bell, Stanley,
Vlandis, Murry, and LaFleur grew out of the fact that the statute in-
volved in each case irrebuttably presumed the existence of certain
characteristics that were not necessarily true of the class of persons
upon whom it imposed a burden. While the presumptions inherent
in the claim statutes' 5 may be said to be rebuttable in the late-claim
20 1
and relief-from-filing 20 7 proceedings authorized by statute, in practice
-they are not. The presence or absence of prejudice to the defendant,
which is perhaps the most nearly legitimate of all the reasons given
for curtailing the right of a "public" tortfeasor's victim to seek compensa-
tion, is very rarely considered by the courts in making their determina-
tions. 08 Since this is the case, the claim statutes as applied might well
be found violative of procedural due process guarantees.
The responsibility for rectifying the situation presently created by
California's claim requirement lies with the legislature and the judi-
ciary. The statutes, as written, reflect an earnest endeavor to amelio-
rate their potentially harsh impact by providing a late-claim procedure
and an avenue for seeking judicial relief from the filing requirement,
which may be followed when appeal to the defendant agency is of no
avail. Perhaps improvement could be made, however, by redrafting
the relief provision to more explicitly require courts to grant relief any
time within a year from accrual of the cause of action, unless the de-
fendant entity establishes prejudice in terms of the justifications ad-
vanced for the claim requirement. Alternatively, the judiciary could
act on its own initiative to improve the present situation of the public
tort victim by granting relief on a showing, however sparse, of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or reasonable neglect, when no showing of prej-
udice is made by the governmental defendant.
204. 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970).
205. See text accompanying notes 169-175 supra.
206. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§911.4, 911.6.
207. CAL. Gov'T CODE §946.6.
208. See text accompanying notes 186-200 supra.
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Some improvement of the lot of the "public" tortfeasor's victim is
imperative. As the law presently stands, it is a tangled thicket which
all dread to enter and from which few emerge unscathed.
Roberta A. Leslie
